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DUST BOWL HISTORIOGRAPHY

HARRY C. McDEAN

In the late 1930s, Undersecretary of Agricul-

rado, southwestern Kansas, and the panhandles of Texas and Oklahoma.!
The schools were aided by agronomists,
who demonstrated to the students the difference between the soils in the Dust Bowl and
those found elsewhere in the Plains. Here were
soil groups whose configuration was distinctive: most notably, the Dust Bowl had extensive reddish-chestnut soils that bordered upon
brown soils. Although both soil groups were
susceptible to depletion, erosion, and blowing,
the reddish-chestnut soils were especially sensitive to cultural mistreatment.
At the schools historians and rural sociologists also informed the students of their
research in the Dust Bowl. The work of Jesse
T. Sanders, Robert T. McMillan, and Otis
Duncan in the social and the agricultural
history of the Dust Bowl especially explained
why its soils were mistreated and how that
mistreatment generated the great dust storms
of the 1930s. Although this history was
complex, the students learned how cultural
traits of Dust Bowl residents encouraged
excesses by many of its farmers in the 1920s.
For while other Great Plains farmers worked
radically to revise their farm operations in
order to conserve the soil, those in the Dust

ture Milburn Lincoln Wilson organized "Travelling Great Plains Schools," culminating three
decades of research and reform work in the
Great Plains. The schools brought hundreds of
rural social scientists together with scores of
federal and state policymakers. The schools
were broken into two sections, one dedicated
to the southern Plains and the other to the
northern. Those who attended spent several
weeks making their way through the Plains,
with care taken to differentiate problems
particular to each of the two regions. In the
southern Plains, the school spent several days
examining the problems specific to the Dust
Bowl area that Wilson's staff clearly delineated
on maps provided the students. As the maps
showed, the term Dust Bowl designated a
specific region in the Great Plains, including
northeastern New Mexico, southeastern ColoProfessor of history at San Diego State University,
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Bowl area thoughtlessly devised dry farming
techniques that allowed them to put under the
plow those soils with high susceptibility to
windblowing. As a result, new dry farming
techniques were applied in the 1920s, destroying the natural, regenerative process that had
kept Dust Bowl soils fertile and intact. 2
Students also learned from the social
scientists that the application of the new
destructive farming techniques was furthered
by several socioeconomic phenomena peculiar
to the Dust Bowl in the 1920s. One was the
tendency of townsfolk to buy or lease raw land
and use the new dry farming techniques to
cultivate it. They planned to farm only as long
as it was profitable to do so, hoping that all
would go well. Another farming development
distinctive to the Dust Bowl area in the 1920s
was the migratory nature of much of its
population. Wage and day laborers routinely
took up tenant farming during slack times.
Viewing such "farming" as interim employment, they were willing to farm land that was
susceptible to depletion. Although they did
not destroy the land wherever they went-for
they ranged into plains areas whose soil was
not so sensitive and routinely wandered into
non-plains states like Arkansas-they helped
to create the farming culture that violated the
tenuous soils of the Dust Bowl.
Social scientists like Duncan, Sanders, and
McMillan provided the students of the schools
with several possible reasons why these developments were peculiar to the Dust Bowl area
during the 1920s. One was that only in the
southern Plains was there considerable parttime mining, lumbering, and oil work available
in the 1920s-hence the migratory nature of
much of its population. Because this transient
population felt no sense of permanence or
belonging, it expressed little interest in the
application of soil conservation measures designed to create a permanently successful farm
population in the region. Another reason was
that other Great Plains states had opened their
land to cultivation in an earlier day and those
settling it had failed and abandoned their land
during the great northern plains drought of

the 1917-23 era. Hence, northern plains
townsfolk already knew what their counterparts in the Dust Bowl region would learn
in the 1930s-that farming of sensitive soil
groups can have disastrous consequences during times of drought.
The goal of the "Travelling Great Plains
Schools" was to pinpoint problems specific to
precise areas within the Plains and to suggest
resolutions to them. Since they were traveling
schools, subsequent meetings were organized.
These brought together leading economists,
farm management experts, historians, rural
social scientists, meteorologists, climatologists,
astronomers, astrophysicists, geologists, ecologists, dendrochronologists, anthropologists,
archaeologists, and geographers. Their mission
was to study "to what extent science can
produce a program for land use" in specific
areas of the Plains, "which, if put into operation, will bring harmony between man and
nature."l
The extent to which these experts succeeded in this mission is difficult to assess.
Indeed, the question provides the subject of
lively debate among modern scholars, especially historians, who write on the Dust Bowl. Yet,
in spite of the robustness of the debate,
modern Dust Bowl historians have accurately
captured in their works most of the aforementioned facts about the Dust Bowl. Unfortunately, one cannot say the same about some of
those who write survey textbooks in American
history, for they fail to grasp even the most
elementary facts about the Dust Bowl.
As a result, modern Dust Bowl history is
schizophrenic. Even the most basic characteristic of the Dust Bowl-its geographic boundary-has two different compositions. The
textbook writers locate the Dust Bowl in a
variety of places where the Dust Bowl history
books do not: in the Great Plains generally, or
in states outside the Plains, or often anywhere
that the dust blew in the thirties. Most
commonly, these writers locate the Dust Bowl
by backtracking the "Okies" to their origins, at
least insofar as they were described by John
Steinbeck in The Grapes of Wrath. 4
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Such inaccurate and vague boundary descriptions become more pronounced when the
textbook writers seem automatically to associate drought conditions with the Dust Bowl.
Bernard Bailyn and associates tell their readers
that improved prices for farm goods in the
mid-1930s were "caused by a cruel drought on
the Great Plains, choking the farmers in vast
clouds of topsoil that swept across the region."
Others say that the drought and its corresponding dust storms were even more pervasive. Stephen Thernstrom contends that
farm price increases in the mid-thirties "were
partly the result of the great droughts and
windstorms and turned many wheat fields into
little Saharas." Arthur Link and associates
never find a Dust Bowl in their text, contending instead that "a severe drought in the
Middle West and Southwest cooperated with
the AAA to reduce farm production." More
surprising is the text of George B. Tindall,
which covers with precision the regional
planning aspects of the New Deal, but fails to
find a Dust Bowl. Indeed, in the absence of
any appraisal of this area, he contends that the
creation of the Soil Conservation Service in
1935 "went far to heal the scars of erosion and
the plague of dust storms," wherever they
were.'
Obviously, these historians live in a different world from that of M. L. Wilson. They
seem to view Great Plains regions differently
than either Wilson or the specialists in Dust
Bowl history. Worse yet, these same historians
miss the most important point made by both
contemporary social scientists of the 1930s and
recent Dust Bowl historians-that the Dust
Bowl was not a natural disaster; it was a
disaster caused by what people did to nature.
Although every old-timer in the Great
Plains realizes that dust has blown there since
only God knows when, both the contemporary rural social scientists and recent Dust
Bowl historians have shown that a special set
of conditions caused the dust to blow massively during one particular time in an exact
location. The intent of their work, in fact, was
to reveal the complexity of natural, human,

and technical events that combined to cause
the great dust storms in the Dust Bowl.
Clearly, our textbook writers are ignorant of
their conclusions. Why is this? There are
several possible explanations.
One reason might be that they have been
deceived by books or articles that have Dust
Bowl in their titles but whose texts cover other
subject matter. One such study was favorably
reviewed in spite of its misleading title: Walter
Stein's California and the Dust Bowl Migration. 6
Stein neither tells his reader where the Dust
Bowl region was nor does he distinguish its
problems or its migrants from those in the
other areas. To add to the mystery, Stein
contends that the migration was but part of a
larger migration from the Great Plains which
began in the 1920s. To him, "The Great Plains
tier of the United States embraces five states
from the Dakotas on the north to Texas on the
South."; One wonders which of the remaining
seven Great Plains states are recognized as
such by Stein. Stein also views the migrants
from a perspective different from that of
contemporary rural social scientists and recent
Dust Bowl historians. For although he concedes that the dust storms were "a man-made
catastrophe," he sees a network of natural,
economic, technical, and political conditions
converging to create victims-poor, defenseless, Dust Bowl migrants who fled to
California. S In fact, it was Stein's and Steinbeck's "victims" who did the victimizing; at
least some of them helped form the farming
culture that created the ecological disaster
called the Dust Bowl.
In defense of Stein and more certainly of
Steinbeck, one must understand that their
works appeared before most of the recent
histories on the Dust Bowl were published.
Although these two authors could not benefit
from that research, our recent textbook writers
could have. Why have these historians failed
to balance off the work of Stein and Steinbeck
against these recently published Dust Bowl
histories? Perhaps their inability to do so stems
from misperceptions about the region encouraged by the specialists' varied approaches to it.
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For example, most historical treatments of
the drought of the 1930s fail to distinguish the
Dust Bowl from other drought areas. Here,
historians of the drought tend to lump all
problems, issues, policies, and programs into
one package and treat them as a whole.
Therefore, for anyone but a specialist in Great
Plains studies, reading such work can only
suggest that any conclusions that apply in one
area of the Plains necessarily apply in another.
Several otherwise superior articles on the
drought in the thirties encourage the thought
that wherever one looks in the Great Plains
one encounters similar problems and issues. C.
Robert Lambert's "The Drought Cattle Purchase, 1934-35: Problems and Complaints,"
Van L. Perkins's, "New Dealers and the
Drought of 1934," and Mary Hargreaves's,
"Land-Use Planning in Response to Drought:
The Experience of the Thirties" -all stress the
federal policies designed to meet problems
widespread in the drought areas at the expense
of highlighting problems peculiar to specific
areas in the Plains.'
Of course, this tendency has been counterbalanced by work that does distinguish the
problems of particular areas in the Plains. For
example, as early as 1969, Theodore Saloutos,
in his article "The New Deal and Farm Policy
in the Great Plains," notes that "In the Dust
Bowl of the southern Great Plains there was a
great need for checking wind erosion, especiallyon nuisance lands owned by absentee
owners."I" Still, Saloutos's work and that of
others suffers from the possibility of misinterpretation. II True, these works do distinguish
clearly the areas in the Plains that they are
about. Yet their purpose was to examine the
origins and the character of broad federal
policies and programs in the Great Plains.
Thus it is fair to say that recent "drought" and
Great Plains histories tend to dim the distinctive features in the Dust Bowl.
But there is yet another possible reason
why our textbook writers misunderstand the
Dust Bowl. Perhaps it is because the bias of
some Dust Bowl historians has helped create
misperceptions about it in the minds of the

textbook writers.
In fact, a major misconception of Stein and
Steinbeck provides the basis upon which Paul
Bonnifield-the author of the first of three
major histories on the Dust Bowl to appear in
recent years-builds his work. I2 Although this
book should not misguide anyone interested in
the region's boundaries (it provides accurate
maps of the area), it advances vigorously one
of Stein's misinterpretations: that those who
left the Dust Bowl were victims of government
policy. It even goes beyond Stein to maintain
that those who remained in the Dust Bowl
were also victimized by the government. This
prejudice against the policies of the federal
government is argued in an unusual but
nonetheless compelling way. Bonnifield maintains there is ample evidence to indicate that,
had the migrants not been forced off their
farms by government policy, they would have
worked out farming systems to prevent future
Dust Bowls while earning standards of living
comparable to those of other Americans.
Bonnifield's approach is intriguing. He
begins by showing his readers that not only is
drought commonplace in the history of the
Plains, but so is the dust storm. Bonnifield
dates dust storms back to the 1850s, noting
that the editor of the Kansas Free State believed
there was a "normal blowing season" in
Kansas that "makes anyone exposed to it as
'sooty' as a collier." In discussing subsequent
droughts and dust-blowing situations in the
true Dust Bowl region, Bonnifield shows that
those who didn't leave the region "adapted to
the new conditions and continued their business." Moreover, there always existed "a few
hardy souls who moved in to continue the task
of opening the country."I;
With this stage in Dust Bowl history set in
place, Bonnifield is able to uncover a historical
plot. Arguing that "hard times were not new
to the old-timers," Bonnifield shows how in
the 1930s Dust Bowl "farmers were making
genuine efforts to meet the crisis caused by
wind and drought." He finds farmers like
Charles T. Peacock, who designed a machine
that formed "a lister row and placed check

DUST BOWL HISTORIOGRAPHY 121

dams at regular intervals." These and similar
farm innovations demonstrate, says Bonnifield, that "the people of the dust bowl were
not defeated, poverty-ridden people without
hope. They were builders for tomorrow.
During those hard years they continued to
build their churches, their businesses, their
schools, their colleges, their communities.
They grew closer to God and fonder of the
land. Hard years were common in their past,
but the future belonged to those who were
ready to seize the moment."!4
Given these conditions and attitudes, why
then did anyone leave the Dust Bowl? Because
"despite statements to the contrary, the federal
government was involved in removal and steps
were being taken to force people out. It was
planned to return the majority of the land to
grazing under government control." And who
specifically designed this plot? Apparently, the
schemers were Lewis C. Gray of the National
Resources Board, Hugh Bennett of the Soil
Conservation Service, and M. L. Wilson of the
USDA. Bonnifield particularly blames Wilson
who, as undersecretary of agriculture, "had
several years' experience in promoting his
program [and] was in a position to carry out
his concept of rational land-use program on a
grand scale."!5
What was Wilson's most lethal weapon in
the scheme? The Soil Conservation Districts
Act, which, says Bonnifield, the farmers in the
Dust Bowl viewed as a "scheme of reorganizing
their society and drastically changing their
land ownership." The result, he said, was that
"they dealt a big blow to the scheme . . . by
voting down the proposed Soil Conservation
Districts." This was important, says Bonnifield, in part because it was the chief weapon in
Wilson's arsenal to redesign life in the Dust
Bowl. The districts, had they been created,
would also have given the Soil Conservation
Service greater power in the Dust Bowl, and
no sensible farmer wanted that. It would have
been particularly bad, says Bonnifield, because
"not a single new implement or technique of
preventing wind erosion was developed by the
Soil Conservation Service." What farmer

would want to work with that organization?
More important, "the advancements by the
farmers in developing new implements and
techniques were not emulated by the Soil
Conservation Service." Finally, their methods
were costly.!6
Anyone who finds Bonnifield's conclusions
convincing is cautioned to read other recently
published articles and books on the Dust Bowl
as well as studies from the thirties.!7 Should
Bonnifield himself read this body of work, he
would then understand that Wilson believed
that federal, state, and local experts needed to
work closely with local farmers to recognize
and resolve problems specific to their farm
area. To the extent there was any grand design
in the Soil Conservation Districts Act, that
was it.
Bonnifield's conspiracy theory aside, the
strength in his book builds from its detailed
discussion of how "the farmers did take
unnecessary chances and in general were
careless about protection against wind erosion" in the Dust Bowl. In spite of the
advances in "scientific dryland farming [that]
were designed to conserve moisture," Bonnifield shows why "the dry surface of moist soil
will blow" anyway. Therefore, to stop the
blowing "it was necessary to develop techniques and technology aimed specifically at
wind erosion."!8 Thus, even the harshest critic
of New Deal planning agrees with other recent
Dust Bowl historians on one point: the great
Dust Bowl of the thirties was created by
people, not by drought and wind.
Although Donald Worster's history of the
Dust Bowl, the second of three major books to
appear in recent years, agrees with Bonnifield
on this one point, it does so for reasons that
stem from a bias antithetical to Bonnifield's.!9
It is Worster's belief that the Dust Bowl grew
out of, and was worsened by, the inability or
unwillingness of the federal government to
curtail the exploitive tendencies of capitalist
farmers.
It is possible that Worster's bias unwittingly
contributed to our textbook writers' misconception of the Dust Bowl. For all the merits of
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his book, which won the Bancroft Prize,
Worster blurs the distinctiveness of the Dust
Bowl region through his strenuous effort to
convince his reader that American culture
created the people who make Dust Bowls. As
Worster puts it, there "are ecological values
taught by the capitalist ethos." These values,
he says, created the Dust Bowl. "It came about
because the expansionary energy of the United
States had finally encountered a volatile,
marginal land, destroying the delicate ecological balance that had evolved there." What did
it was not the people's plows, but their "social
system, a set of values, an economic order," or
"those elements of capitalism."zo
This proposition is perhaps the most engaging of any presented by recent Dust Bowl
historians. And the history Worster weaves
around this line of reasoning is presented so
compactly that one feels compelled to believe
it. Yet Worster's panoramic view of American
culture and the value it places on exploitation·
tends to compromise his work. For he carries
his message beyond the boundaries of his
study and encourages the thought that Dust
Bowls might occur virtually anywhere, regardless of the character of the people and of the
land.
Worster's cataclysmic view of American
culture is pushed relentlessly upon the reader.
Contending that Americans have "a greater
resource hunger than others, greater eagerness
to take risks, and less capacity for restraint,"
Worster concludes that they made a marginal
land into a Dust Bowl. The Dust Bowl was
"the inevitable outcome of a culture that
deliberately, self-consciously, set itself that task
of dominating and exploiting the land for all it
was worth. The entirety of the Great Plains is
threatened: "the region," warns Worster, "may
be in the most serious ecological trouble it has
ever seen." And anyone who thinks he is safe
because he farms not only outside the Great
Plains but outside the United States altogether
should take heed of this warning: the expansion of American farming culture "to other
nations has already begun to create a new
chain of environmental disasters."Z!

Worster's forebodings aside, his approach
persuades his readers to overlook the fact that
in the Dust Bowl there were natural conditions
specific to that area. Moreover, it does not
permit the reader to understand that these
natural conditions encountered a particular
farm culture-likewise specific to the area-in
the 1920s and the 1930s. And that, together,
they created the Dust Bowl.
Rather, Worster's approach leads the reader to ask: "Why study the Dust Bowl at all?"
After all, is not American farm culture headed
toward the "inevitable," the creation of widespread dust bowls and "ecological disasters"?
For, as Worster himself says, the purpose of the
book is "to explain why the world is facing a
future of dust bowls.""
Yet this conclusion ignores some of the
research done in the Plains by rural social
scientists during the 1920s a;d early 1930s. 23
For example, in Oklahoma these researchers
found a phenomenon that profoundly affected
the farm economy of their state-a "culture of
migratoriness." As Sheila Manes describes this
phenomenon, it was a "peculiar [to this specific
area), impoverishing system . . . that moved
mostly locally, but also in slightly wider circles,
back and forth" among several southwestern
states, including the area that became the Dust
Bowl. z4 Not only was it made up of numerous
workers who viewed farming as part-time or
interim employment, but its volume ebbed and
flowed with the tide of nonagricultural work in
the area. Hence, Manes's work (and that of'
others) shows how this migratoriness combined with other cultural traits peculiar to
those who farmed in this region to help create
the ecological disaster called the Dust Bowl;
farm conditions in the Dust Bowl were not
only peculiar to this one specific area but also
to a specific period in time, roughly between
the two World Wars.zs
Moreover, these conditions and the farming practices that created them were clearly
out of step with the vanguard of farming
systems being developed elsewhere in the
Plains by the pure scientists and social scientists who worked for the experiment stations,
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the agricultural colleges, or the USDA itself.
Their scholarly publications during the twenties and thirties help to explain why a Dust
Bowl never occurred elsewhere in the Plains.
They demonstrate clearly how some plains
states were far more attentive than others to
recognizing and resolving their specific farm
problems. 26
Montana was especially advanced in making significant reforms in land conservation
and management. The publications of M. L.
Wilson, Elmer Starch, E. ]. Bell, and Dwight
Sanderson are among the many that explain
how Montana's public institutions cooperated
closely with both federal and private agencies
(like the Rockefeller Foundation) to recognize
and resolve the particular problems of farmers
and farming areas in Montana. 27 These efforts
resulted in new soil conservation technologies-like the duckfoot cultivator that formed
a clod rather than a dust mulch, furrow drills
that listed wheat, shelter belts, dry land
irrigation systems, strip farming, and farm
diversification. As Montana historian Robert
G. Dunbar points out, these soil conservation
techniques were widely adopted in the northcentral part of the state when the drought of
the thirties came. 28
Additionally, scholars might look closely at
the efforts of the Bureau of Agricultural
Economics to persuade the Great Plains states
to address their problems. For example, early
in the 1920s the BAE sought to identify
"pathological farming areas" in the Great
Plains. 29 This was official jargon for "diseased"
areas-those with a combination of natural
and human factors at work creating a sick
farming culture.
Perhaps the BAE should have picked a
better phrase than pathological farming areas,
for some states resented its application to
certain of their sections. The agricultural
college in Kansas so resented these designations that it steadfastly refused during the
1920s to cooperate with the BAE in recognizing problems peculiar to these areas in Kansas
and in seeking to solve any recognized problems. In fact, William Jardine-who served as

director of the agricultural experiment station,
as dean of the college of agriculture, and finally
as president of Kansas State College-was
made secretary of agriculture in March 1925 in
part because President Calvin Coolidge and
Secretary of Commerce Herbert Hoover knew
that Jardine would relish firing Henry C.
Taylor, the man who directed the BAE and
launched the "pathological farming area"
efforts. 'o
One should not belabor the point that
separates Worster from Manes and the rural
social scientists who lived in and studied the
culture of Dust Bowl area residents in the
1920s and 1930s. But this commentary does
suggest another reason why our textbook
writers and other scholars continue to believe
that the drought created the Dust Bowl: It is
quite possible that they have not read this
body of work, or at least have not read it
carefully.
This suspicion is furthered by the fact that
the third book-length history of the Dust Bowl
to appear in recent years-that of R. Douglas
Hurt-has no discernible bias running through
it." Hurt provides such a well-balanced and
straightforward account that one cannot read
it and fail to understand the character and
causes of the Dust Bowl.
Yet in spite of Hurt's work, not only do the
misconceptions of the survey text writers
persist but even specialists in western history
provide accounts of the Dust Bowl that
continue to present misconceptions of the
Dust Bowl, their declarations implying knowledge of Bonnifield, Worster, and Hurt not
withstanding. Here, a recent book by Richard
Lowitt, The New Deal and the West, comes to
mind. 32 Lowitt devotes two chapters to the
Great Plains, yet the Dust Bowl does not
appear until near the end of the second of
these chapters. One encounters it in an
unusual way. Lowitt explains that throughout
the Plains "the wind whipped the topsoil into
great drifts," often causing minor streams to
disappear "and major ones, such as the Red
River along the eastern boundary of the
Dakotas," to become "hardly more than a
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creek." But, says Lowitt, "the brunt of these
storms fell on western Kansas, eastern Colorado, western Oklahoma, the Texas panhandle,
and parts of New Mexico. This area soon
became known as the Dust Bowl, but dust
swirled over the entire area of the Great
Plains.""
Lowitt's choice of words here, ("these
storms fell on") betrays his lack of understanding of the Dust Bowl. It is his view that
identical forces were at work throughout the
Great Plains; it is just that the Dust Bowl got
the worst of them. Throughout the thirty
pages of text dedicated to the Great Plains,
Lowitt fails to find any problems that were
unusual to the Dust Bowl area. Save for one
brief paragraph where he dedicates a few
sentences to soil conservation practices applied
in the Dust Bowl area, Lowitt makes no effort
to review the natural or the human conditions
that were specific to that area.
Because Lowitt views the problems in the
Dust Bowl and the Plains as one and the same,
he is led to draw some peculiar conclusions. He
says that throughout the Plains there were
"conditions and practices fostering erosion
and drought." Just which conditions and
practices fostered drought we are never told.
But Lowitt does explore those that fostered
erosion. Apparently, he agrees with the report
of the Great Plains Drought Area C<5mmittee,
which he quotes as saying "the basic cause of
the present Great Plains situation is our
attempt to impose upon the region a system of
agriculture to which the Plains are not adapted
or to bring into a semi-arid region methods
which are suitable, on the whole, only for a
humid region." In fact, Lowitt contends that
this assumption became "official New Deal
Gospel." Having coined a phrase, Lowitt then
proceeds to show how it resulted in only
"fragmented reforms" in the Plains, another
phrase of Lowitt's whose meaning one wonders about. After all this, one is not surprised
when he ends his chapters on the Plains by
asking if the "historic cycle . . . of adequate
rainfall and drought would begin anew."]4
It is difficult to understand how Lowitt

arrived at such conclusions in view of his
statement in a footnote that "the best, most
balanced and most comprehensive study is by
R. Douglas Hurt, Dust Bowl," for Hurt's book
does not support Lowitt's contentions. J5 Hurt
begins by carefully delineating the Dust Bowl
area. Having clearly established these boundaries, he then shows how dust blowing occurred
throughout the Plains as far back as recorded
settlement reveals. This being the case, Hurt
closes his first chapter by observing that in the
Dust Bowl area these storms were exacerbated
by "the adoption of a new [my emphasis]
agricultural technology."]6 In the second chapter, aptly titled "Causes of the Dust Bowl,"
Hurt takes great care to identify the "composition" of the "major soil groups" specific to the
area that, together with "the settlement of
man, were responsible for the creation of the
Dust Bowl."
Only after carefully examining the Dust
Bowl's soils and the special new agricultural
technologies employed there during the 1920s
does Hurt move on to provide a view of
broader issues, such as the climate of the Plains
in general and the federal homesteading policies. Even here, Hurt provides insights into
agricultural techniques peculiar to the Dust
Bowl area. For instance, he draws upon Leslie
Hewes's work on suitcase farming to explain
how this type of farmer was endemic to the
Dust Bowl area. He had "flexibility. If a crop
failed, a suitcase farmer still had another
income, and his livelihood did not depend
upon him remaining on the land. If a wheat
crop did not look profitable, a suitcase farmer
could abandon his fields to the mercy of the
wind. When suitcase farmers abandoned their
land, they seldom returned to apply the proper
soil conservation techniques to keep it under
control."" Hurt then proceeds to provide a
detailed analysis of how, beginning in the late
1930s, farmers worked with federal, state, and
local officials to create particular agricultural
technologies designed to meet problems specific to the Dust Bowl area. By the 1950s, says
Hurt, "the Dust Bowl farmers understood the
relationship between soil conservation and
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successful farming. "38
As a result of Hurt's study-and of others
discussed above-we now have a clear understanding of the parameters and causes of the
Dust Bowl of the 1930s. Those who write
textbooks of American history and monographs on the Great Plains need only to take
heed of their contributions. Beyond that,
scholars might also want to note that recent
Dust Bowl histories provide instruction in the
problem of marginality in modernizing societies: they show us how marginal people operate
in a marginal economy. Here are people whose
abilities do not square with the needs of
modernizing societies-their abilities do not fit
into the emerging technostructure. They are
therefore left to carve out for themselves a life
in the margins-those areas of the ecostructure
where modern economic institutions do not
choose to venture. These are usually areas
where the returns are small and the risks are
high-such as in the Dust Bowl.
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